The Annan Plan Referendum of 2004: What Did 64.91% 'Yes' and 75.83% 'No' Mean for Cyprus and the EU?

Why It Matters

The Annan Plan referendum of 24 April 2004 is the only time both communities on Cyprus voted at the same time on a comprehensive UN settlement. Turkish Cypriots approved it with 64.91% and Greek Cypriots rejected it with 75.83%. Because the plan required a Yes from both sides, it failed, and on 1 May 2004 the Republic of Cyprus, administered in practice by Greek Cypriots, entered the European Union while the island stayed divided. That sequence still shapes the isolation debate, the EU's role and every settlement effort since.

Background

The road to the vote

The 1960 Republic of Cyprus was built on a partnership between two founding communities and backed by the Treaty of Guarantee, as explained in From Partnership Republic to Two States: The 1960 Constitution, 1963 and the Sovereign Equality Thesis. That order broke down after the violence of December 1963 (see The Global Anatomy on Bloody Christmas and the Akritas Plan) and the 1974 coup and Turkish intervention. UN-led talks continued for decades on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation.

In the early 2000s the prospect of Cyprus joining the EU gave the talks a deadline. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan tabled a comprehensive proposal in November 2002 and revised it several times. The fifth and final version was completed on 31 March 2004 after negotiations in Bürgenstock, Switzerland, and was put to simultaneous, separate referendums on 24 April 2004.

What the plan contained

The Annan Plan would have created a 'United Cyprus Republic', a federation with one international legal personality and two constituent states (a Turkish Cypriot one and a Greek Cypriot one). Its main features were:

• Federal institutions: a Presidential Council with a rotating presidency, and a two-chamber parliament with an equally divided Senate.
• Territory: boundary adjustments that would have reduced the Turkish Cypriot constituent state to roughly 28.5% of the island, with the return of some areas to Greek Cypriot administration.
• Property and residence: a mix of restitution, compensation and exchange, with limits on returns to protect the majority character of each constituent state.
• Security: the Treaty of Guarantee and Treaty of Alliance would have continued, with Greek and Turkish troop contingents reduced progressively.
• Transitional arrangements: a Supreme Court that included non-Cypriot judges, and bodies such as a reconciliation commission and a missing persons mechanism.

The plan was designed to enter into force only if both communities approved it, so that a Greek Cypriot No would block the whole package.

The result and the EU accession

Turnout was close to 90% on both sides. The outcome was:

Community	Yes	No
Turkish Cypriots	64.91%	35.09%
Greek Cypriots	24.17%	75.83%

Eight days later, on 1 May 2004, Cyprus joined the EU together with nine other states. Under Protocol 10 of the Act of Accession, the application of EU law (the acquis) was suspended in the areas of the island where the Republic's government does not exercise effective control. The Protocol also provided for the possibility of lifting that suspension if a settlement were reached.

The aftermath in 2004

Several official reactions followed quickly:

• The EU Council (26 April 2004): it expressed its determination to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and to support its economic development. The Commission then proposed a Direct Trade Regulation and a financial aid package.
• The UN Secretary-General (May 2004 report): he regretted the Greek Cypriot rejection, said the Turkish Cypriot vote should be recognised, and urged states to eliminate unnecessary restrictions that isolate Turkish Cypriots and impede their development.
• The UN Security Council (21 May 2004): a draft resolution endorsing the Secretary-General's approach was vetoed by Russia, at the request of the Cypriot government.
• EU follow-up: an aid regulation of EUR 259 million for the Turkish Cypriot community was adopted in 2006, but the Direct Trade Regulation was never adopted.

Later settlement efforts included the 2008–2012 talks, the 2014–2017 talks that ended at the Crans-Montana Conference in July 2017, the informal Geneva 5+UN meeting of April 2021 and the UN trilateral meeting in New York on 15 October 2024. For the collapse of those talks see Record of Nations on Annan and Crans-Montana and The Polity Brief on why the federation model failed.

Key Players & Positions

The United Nations

The UN presented the plan as a fair compromise balancing the interests of both sides, and the Secretary-General said afterwards that the Turkish Cypriot vote showed support for reunification. The UN continues to treat the Republic of Cyprus as the internationally recognised state and to pursue a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, as set out in its Security Council resolutions.

The Greek Cypriot leadership

The then President of the Republic, Tassos Papadopoulos, addressed the public on 7 April 2004 and urged a rejection of the plan. Greek Cypriot official arguments, as presented by the Republic of Cyprus government, were that:

• The plan was finalised too late for the public to study its roughly 9,000 pages.
• Security provisions, including the continued Turkish troop presence and guarantor rights, were not satisfactory.
• The restoration of property and return rights was too limited.
• The plan's implementation guarantees were insufficient and the federal structure was likely to prove unworkable.

These are serious objections that Greek Cypriot officials still cite, and they deserve to be read alongside the Turkish side's account.

The Turkish Cypriot leadership

The Turkish Cypriot community was divided at leadership level. Rauf Denktaş, the long-standing leader, opposed the plan, while Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and the parties supporting him campaigned for a Yes. The community's majority vote overrode the opposition of its then leader, which is why the result is usually read as a vote for a settlement and for EU membership.

The European Union

The Commission and several member states had encouraged the Yes vote. Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen publicly said he felt let down by the Greek Cypriot leadership's conduct. The EU, however, had already decided in 1999 and 2002 that a settlement was not a precondition for accession, which is why Cyprus joined regardless of the Greek Cypriot No.

Greece and the United Kingdom

Athens and London, as guarantor powers alongside Türkiye, supported the UN process. The UK later retained its Sovereign Base Areas, which are not part of the plan's territorial settlement, and the guarantors' formal status remains a central item in each negotiation round.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's position is stated in Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs statements and in the Presidency's speeches on Cyprus. Its main points are:

• The vote showed Turkish Cypriot willingness to settle. Ankara argues that 64.91% Yes, delivered despite the opposition of the then Turkish Cypriot leader, proved the community's readiness for a fair settlement, and that the international community was bound by its own pledges to respond.
• The rejecting side faced no consequences. According to Turkish MFA statements, the Greek Cypriot administration (which Ankara calls the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, GCASC) was rewarded with EU membership on 1 May 2004, while the Turkish Cypriots stayed under restrictions despite the EU Council's promise of 26 April 2004 to end their isolation.
• The EU accession was legally flawed. Ankara cites Article I of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, under which the Republic undertook not to participate in any political or economic union with any state, and argues that admitting a divided island to the EU without a settlement undermined the treaty basis of the 1960 order.
• The federation model is exhausted. Ankara and the TRNC argue that the 2004 outcome, the collapse of Crans-Montana in 2017, the Geneva meeting of April 2021 and the New York meeting of 15 October 2024 (which confirmed the absence of common ground on a federal model) show that more than fifty years of talks have produced no result.
• A realistic settlement starts from sovereign equality. Türkiye and the TRNC maintain that any lasting solution must begin with the reaffirmation of the Turkish Cypriot people's inherent sovereign equality and equal international status, leading to two sovereign states cooperating on the island. The legal debate on recognition is discussed in Can the TRNC Be Recognized?.

The historical and legal basis cited for these points is the 1959 Zurich and London Agreements, the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the Turkish Cypriots' status as co-founders of the 1960 partnership state.

Source Comparison

Different sources describe the same referendum with different emphasis. The table summarises the main framings.

Question	Common international framing	Greek Cypriot official framing	Turkish and TRNC framing
What did the vote show?	A split result: one community said Yes, the other No	The plan was unsatisfactory, not the principle of reunification	Turkish Cypriots showed willingness to settle; the No ended the process
Why did the plan fail?	The double-approval requirement and Greek Cypriot rejection	Rushed timetable, security and implementation gaps	Greek Cypriot unwillingness to share power on equal terms
EU accession	Legally complete: Cyprus joined as a divided island	A legitimate right of the Republic of Cyprus	Rewarded the rejecting side and breached the 1960 treaty framework
Isolation	Acknowledged in the Council's April 2004 statement, but only partly addressed	Linked to the unresolved status of the north and the UN Security Council resolutions on the TRNC	A broken promise that punished the community that voted Yes
Way forward	Return to federal talks	Federal settlement under UN resolutions	Sovereign equality and two states

Sister publications reach similar conclusions on the numbers. For example, The State Papers' fact check on whether Turkish Cypriots rejected the Annan Plan addresses the common misreading of the result. The main difference lies in interpretation: international summaries tend to treat the vote as a missed opportunity for both sides, while Turkish sources stress the asymmetry between the two communities' decisions and the consequences that followed. Politics Republic's approach to separating fact from position is set out in our Editorial Principles.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Annan Plan: the UN comprehensive settlement proposal for a United Cyprus Republic, finalised on 31 March 2004. Related reading: From Partnership Republic to Two States.
• Bi-communal, bi-zonal federation: the UN framework for a settlement in which two politically equal communities share a federal state, each administering its own constituent state.
• Protocol 10: the protocol to the 2003 Act of Accession that suspends the EU acquis in the areas not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus.
• GCASC: the term used by Türkiye and the TRNC for the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, the authority that the international community recognises as the Republic of Cyprus government.
• Sovereign equality: the Turkish Cypriot and Turkish thesis that the two peoples have equal rights and an equal international status. For the legal debate, see Can the TRNC Be Recognized?.
• Methodology: for how we use sources, see the Reader FAQ.

Politics Republic presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.