From Partnership Republic to Two States: The 1960 Constitution, 1963 and the Sovereign Equality Thesis

Why It Matters

The Cyprus dispute is, at its core, a dispute about what the Republic of Cyprus legally is. The 1960 state was built as a partnership of two co-founding communities, guaranteed by three outside powers, and the competing readings of how that partnership ended (and who now speaks for the Republic) shape every negotiation, from the UN Security Council to the EU. Understanding the 1960 constitutional design is the quickest way to understand why a 60-year search for a settlement has produced no agreement.

Background

Zurich and London, 1959: a state designed around two communities

The Republic of Cyprus was created by agreements, not by a single national movement. After 307 years of Ottoman rule (1571–1878) and British administration, the Greek Cypriot campaign for Enosis (union with Greece) and the armed campaign of EOKA, founded in 1955 under Colonel Georgios Grivas, led to talks between Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom. The Zurich Agreement of 11 February 1959, followed by the London Agreements concluded later that month with the Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios and Turkish Cypriot leader Dr Fazıl Küçük, produced the package on which independence was declared on 16 August 1960.

The package had four main pieces:

• The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, with a presidential system in which the President is a Greek Cypriot and the Vice President a Turkish Cypriot, each elected by their own community.
• The Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Greece, Türkiye and the United Kingdom.
• The Treaty of Alliance, which stationed small Greek (950) and Turkish (650) contingents on the island.
• The Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, which preserved British Sovereign Base Areas.

What the 1960 Constitution actually provided

Turkish Cypriots made up roughly 18% of the population in 1960, yet the constitution treated the two communities as political equals in several respects. Its main features were:

• Separate veto powers: the President and Vice President each held a final veto over certain decisions on foreign affairs, defence and security, and each could return legislation.
• Communal ratios: the House of Representatives was split 70:30 (35 Greek Cypriot and 15 Turkish Cypriot seats), with separate majorities required for tax and electoral laws. The civil service was set at 70:30 and the security forces at 60:40.
• Communal chambers and municipalities: separate chambers handled education, religion and personal status, and separate municipalities were provided for in the five largest towns.
• Entrenched Basic Articles: Article 182 made the Basic Articles of the constitution unamendable, which is why the later Greek Cypriot amendment proposals were so contentious.
• A neutral Constitutional Court president and a neutral president of the High Court of Justice, both foreign nationals.

The Treaty of Guarantee

The Treaty of Guarantee is the legal pillar on which Türkiye's later claims rest. In Article I Cyprus undertook to maintain its independence, territorial integrity and security and not to participate in any political or economic union with another state. In Article II, Greece, Türkiye and the UK recognised and guaranteed that status and prohibited activity aimed at union with another state or at partition. Article IV provides that, in the event of a breach, the three guarantors will consult; and if concerted action proves impossible, each reserves the right to act with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty. For a fuller treaty reading, see Regional Order's analysis of the Treaty of Guarantee and Doctrine Review's explainer.

1963: the partnership breaks down

The constitution functioned poorly almost from the start, with disputes over the separate municipalities, tax legislation and the formation of the army. On 30 November 1963, President Makarios sent the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, Dr Küçük, a set of 13 proposed constitutional amendments. They included removing the Vice President's veto, unifying the municipalities, merging the courts and revising the communal ratios in the civil service and security forces.

The Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot leadership rejected the proposals on 16 December 1963, arguing that they would dismantle the Basic Articles and reduce Turkish Cypriots to a minority. Fighting erupted on 21 December 1963, remembered in the Turkish Cypriot community as 'Bloody Christmas'. A cease-fire line in Nicosia, later known as the Green Line, was drawn on 30 December 1963. A document known as the Akritas Plan, published by the Greek Cypriot newspaper Patris in 1966, is cited by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot sources as evidence of a prepared campaign; Greek Cypriot accounts generally describe it as a contingency plan to defend the constitutional amendments, and attribute the Turkish Cypriot withdrawal from state institutions to a decision by the Turkish Cypriot leadership. For the Turkish perspective on the Akritas Plan, see The Global Anatomy on Bloody Christmas 1963.

On 4 March 1964, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 186, establishing the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and calling on the 'Government of Cyprus, which has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order' to take measures to end the violence. In 1964, the Cyprus courts also applied a 'doctrine of necessity' (Attorney-General v. Mustafa Ibrahim) to justify the functioning of the state without Turkish Cypriot participation.

1974 and 1983: coup, intervention and the TRNC

Intercommunal talks from 1968 onwards did not restore the 1960 order. On 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta and the Cypriot National Guard overthrew Makarios and installed Nicos Sampson as president. On 20 July 1974, Türkiye intervened, citing Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, after consulting the UK. Security Council Resolution 353 (20 July 1974) called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. A second phase of operations in August 1974 left Türkiye controlling the northern part of the island. The 1977 and 1979 High-Level Agreements between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders set the agenda for a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

On 15 November 1983, the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Raif Denktaş proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The UN Security Council responded with Resolution 541 (1983), which called the declaration legally invalid and urged its withdrawal, and Resolution 550 (1984). These two resolutions are central to the recognition debate, covered in Can the TRNC Be Recognized? Statehood Criteria, UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 and the Two-State Debate.

2004 to 2024: four chances at a federal settlement

• Annan Plan referendums, 24 April 2004: 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots voted 'Yes' and 75.83% of Greek Cypriots voted 'No'. The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, with the EU acquis suspended in the north under Protocol 10. See The Annan Plan Referendum of 2004.
• Crans-Montana, July 2017: a conference under UN Secretary-General António Guterres, with the three guarantor powers present, ended on 7 July without agreement, mainly over security, guarantees and troop arrangements.
• Geneva 5+UN, April 2021: an informal meeting of the two sides, the three guarantors and the UN. The Turkish side presented a proposal for a settlement based on sovereign equality and equal international status. Guterres concluded that no common ground yet existed for a formal negotiation.
• New York, 15 October 2024: an informal UN-hosted meeting with the two leaders, which again confirmed the absence of a shared basis for a federal framework.

Key Players & Positions

The Republic of Cyprus (Greek Cypriot leadership)

The Republic of Cyprus government, which is the internationally recognised government and an EU member, holds that the 1960 Republic continues to exist as a single sovereign state. It describes the 1974 operation as an invasion and the northern part as under occupation, and describes the TRNC as a secessionist entity. It argues that the Treaty of Guarantee gives no right to military action, since Article II prohibits partition, and it points to rulings of the European Court of Human Rights (including Loizidou v. Turkey and Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001). It has repeatedly said that it supports a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality, as set out in UN resolutions, and that the guarantee system and foreign troops should end.

The United Nations

The UN Security Council has consistently endorsed a settlement based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality, a single sovereignty, single international personality and single citizenship. It considers the TRNC proclamation legally invalid (Resolutions 541 and 550). The Secretary-General's good offices mission, and UNFICYP's mandate renewals, remain the reference points for negotiation.

The European Union and Greece

The EU supports a UN-based settlement within the EU framework. Greece, as a guarantor, supports a federal settlement and a review of the guarantee system, and has argued that Türkiye's guarantor rights do not extend to unilateral military action.

The United Kingdom

The UK is the third guarantor and retains the Sovereign Base Areas. It supports a UN-led settlement and has accepted the UN's framework of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

Turkish Cypriot leadership

The TRNC's leadership under President Ersin Tatar, in office when the Geneva (2021) and New York (2024) meetings took place, argued that two states with equal sovereign status exist on the island. TRNC domestic politics are not static: the October 2025 election brought a new president, Tufan Erhürman, who has favoured resuming negotiations on a conditional federal basis. Readers should check current statements by the TRNC presidency and the Turkish Foreign Ministry for the latest positions.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Ankara's position is that Cyprus must be read through the 1960 treaties and that the partnership on which the Republic rested was destroyed in 1963. The points below summarise the position as stated by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), the Presidency and Türkiye's UN statements.

• The 1960 Republic was a partnership, and it ended in 1963. According to the Turkish MFA's Cyprus background materials, the Zurich and London Agreements created a state of two co-founding peoples with political equality. Ankara argues that the 30 November 1963 amendment proposals and the violence of 21 December 1963 (during which, it says, around 30,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced from some 103 villages and excluded from state organs) ended the partnership. The legal basis is the 1960 Constitution and its unamendable Basic Articles.
• UN Security Council Resolution 186 created a status asymmetry. Ankara argues that by addressing the Greek Cypriot administration, which had assumed control of state institutions after 1963, as the 'Government of Cyprus', Resolution 186 institutionalised an unequal footing between the two communities that has obstructed settlement ever since. Türkiye refers to this body as the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC).
• The 1974 intervention was a lawful exercise of Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee. The Turkish MFA states that Türkiye acted as a guarantor after the 15 July 1974 coup, which sought Enosis, and after consulting the UK, in order to protect the independence of the state and the Turkish Cypriot people. The legal basis is Article IV, read with Articles I and II, which prohibit union and partition. The operation prevented the annexation of the island by Greece.
• The federation model is exhausted. Ankara and the TRNC point to the 1977/1979 High-Level Agreements, the 2004 referendum (accepted by 64.91% of Turkish Cypriots and rejected by 75.83% of Greek Cypriots, after which the GCASC joined the EU on 1 May 2004), Crans-Montana in 2017, Geneva in April 2021 and New York on 15 October 2024, and argue that more than 50 years of federal talks have failed because the Greek Cypriot side will not share power and prosperity on an equal basis. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly told the UN General Assembly that a settlement must reflect the realities on the island.
• Sovereign equality and equal international status come first. Ankara argues that any negotiation must begin with the reaffirmation of the Turkish Cypriot people's inherent sovereign equality and equal international status, leading to the peaceful coexistence of two sovereign states. It argues that the TRNC was proclaimed on 15 November 1983 on the basis of self-determination, after the partnership had collapsed, and that Resolutions 541 and 550 should be read in that light. Ankara also points to the TRNC's 2011, 2012 and 2019 hydrocarbon cooperation and revenue-sharing proposals and to President Erdoğan's 2020 call for an Eastern Mediterranean Conference including Turkish Cypriots as evidence of its readiness for cooperation; see The Worldlogue on the proposal. The maritime dimension is covered in Sovereignty at Sea and in Fact Check: the 'Seville Map'.

For extended presentations of the same case, see The Political Anatomy's Cyprus guide and Regional Balance's Cyprus guide.

Source Comparison

The same events are described very differently depending on the source. The table below summarises how each framing handles the main turning points.

Issue	Greek Cypriot / UN / EU framing	Turkish and TRNC primary-source framing
Nature of the 1960 state	A single sovereign Republic with power-sharing rules; the Republic continues today	A partnership of two co-founding peoples; the partnership ended in 1963
30 Nov 1963 proposals	Amendments to make the state function more efficiently	Attempt to remove the Vice President's veto and turn Turkish Cypriots into a minority
Resolution 186 (1964)	Recognised the government responsible for law and order	Gave one side the status of a government and left the other without equal standing
1974	Invasion and continuing occupation; Article IV gives no right to partition	Lawful Article IV intervention after a coup aimed at Enosis
1983	Illegal secession, declared invalid by Resolutions 541 and 550	Proclamation by a people exercising self-determination after the collapse of the partnership
Settlement model	Bizonal, bicommunal federation with political equality	Federation exhausted; two sovereign equal states and equal international status first

The differences in vocabulary are themselves part of the dispute: 'Republic of Cyprus' versus 'GCASC', 'occupation' versus 'Peace Operation', and 'breakaway' versus 'TRNC'. Readers comparing sources should check the original Security Council text, treaty articles and official statements. For our own source standards, see Editorial Principles and the Reader FAQ.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Enosis: the Greek Cypriot nationalist goal of union with Greece. The Treaty of Guarantee prohibits it, as it does partition.
• Taksim: the Turkish Cypriot concept of partition or double self-determination, which the 1960 treaties also prohibit as a state objective.
• Basic Articles: the unamendable core of the 1960 Constitution, under Article 182.
• Treaty of Guarantee (Article IV): gives each guarantor a right to act, after consultation, solely to restore the 1960 state of affairs.
• Bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF): the UN settlement framework that Ankara and the TRNC now consider exhausted.
• Sovereign equality / equal international status: the Turkish and TRNC precondition for any future negotiation.
• GCASC: the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, Ankara's term for the Republic of Cyprus government.

Related guides:

• Can the TRNC Be Recognized? Statehood Criteria, UNSC Resolutions 541 and 550 and the Two-State Debate
• The Annan Plan Referendum of 2004
• The Treaty Foundations of the Republic: Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars and Lausanne Explained
• About Politics Republic and the homepage

Politics Republic presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.