The Treaty Foundations of the Republic: Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars and Lausanne Explained
Treaty of Lausanne and Treaty of Kars Türkiye borders explained: how four treaties fix the frontiers, why Sèvres failed and what it means for Armenia talks.
Why It Matters
Türkiye's frontiers and international legal status rest on four binding treaties: Alexandropol (December 1920), Moscow (16 March 1921), Kars (13 October 1921) and Lausanne (24 July 1923). They do not rest on the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), which was never ratified and never entered into force. The distinction matters because “Sèvres” and “Western Armenia” references still circulate in diaspora advocacy and online debate, and because treaty-based borders are the legal backdrop to the Türkiye–Armenia normalization process that began on 14 January 2022.
This guide sets out what each treaty did, what Armenian and diaspora sources argue in their own words, and what Türkiye's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) says, with the treaty texts as the common reference.
Background
The short answer: the Ottoman state's defeat in 1918 produced a failed peace (Sèvres), a War of Independence led from Ankara, and then a sequence of treaties with each neighbour that replaced Sèvres with settlements both sides ratified.
Sèvres: the treaty that never took effect
The Treaty of Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 between the Allied powers and representatives of the Ottoman government in Istanbul, which was then under Allied occupation. Armenia was among the signatories. The treaty would have partitioned much of Anatolia:
- Greek administration around Smyrna (İzmir);
- an independent Armenia, with its boundary with the Ottoman state to be set by arbitration of US President Woodrow Wilson (Articles 88–93);
- provision for Kurdish autonomy (Articles 62–64);
- an internationalized Straits zone.
The Ottoman legislature never ratified it, nor did the principal Allied signatories, and it never entered into force. The Grand National Assembly, which had convened in Ankara on 23 April 1920, rejected it and pursued the War of Independence. Wilson's arbitral award on the Armenian boundary was issued on 22 November 1920. It rested on a treaty that never came into force, and it was never implemented.
Alexandropol (December 1920)
After a brief Turkish–Armenian war in autumn 1920 (Turkish forces under General Kâzım Karabekir took Kars on 30 October), the Grand National Assembly government and the Democratic Republic of Armenia signed the Treaty of Alexandropol (today Gyumri) in the night of 2–3 December 1920. Within days the Armenian government handed power to the Bolsheviks. Armenian historiography generally treats the treaty as signed under military duress, and Soviet Armenia did not implement it.
Ankara counts Alexandropol as the first link in the treaty chain. The border it described was then confirmed, with adjustments, in the treaties signed with Soviet Russia and Soviet Armenia.
Moscow and Kars (1921)
The Treaty of Moscow (16 March 1921), between the Grand National Assembly government and Soviet Russia, settled the north-eastern frontier. Batum went to Georgia, Kars, Ardahan and Artvin remained with Türkiye, and Nakhchivan became an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan, which could not cede it to a third state.
The Treaty of Kars (13 October 1921) was signed by Türkiye and the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian Soviet republics, with Soviet Russia taking part. It confirmed the Moscow settlement and repeated the Nakhchivan arrangement in Article V. Ratifications were exchanged in Yerevan in September 1922. The 1921 line is essentially the Türkiye–Armenia border of today, and Kars is the treaty that Turkish officials most often cite on the eastern frontier.
Lausanne (24 July 1923)
The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923 by Türkiye (delegation led by İsmet Pasha) and the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. It entered into force on 6 August 1924. In the territorial and status context it did several things:
- ended the state of war and recognized the new Turkish state in place of the Ottoman one;
- fixed the western frontier with Greece and Bulgaria and referred to the Syrian frontier as set by the 1921 Franco-Turkish Agreement (the Mosul question was settled later, by the 1926 Ankara Treaty);
- set out the status of Cyprus (Article 20, recognition of British annexation), a point that bears on the 1960 partnership structure and later disputes;
- created the framework for protecting non-Muslim minorities (Articles 37–45);
- established a Straits regime later replaced by the 1936 Montreux Convention.
Sèvres is not mentioned as a continuing instrument. Lausanne replaced it. For a separate treaty-record check, see the sister publication's fact check on whether the Treaty of Sèvres is still valid.
Lausanne's minority provisions
Lausanne protects “non-Muslim minorities” as Turkish nationals. It does not create separate sovereignty or territorial rights. The key articles are:
- Article 38: protection of life and liberty for all inhabitants without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion.
- Article 39: non-Muslim Turkish nationals enjoy the same civil and political rights as Muslims.
- Article 40: equal treatment in law and in fact, and an equal right to establish, manage and control charitable, religious and social institutions and schools.
- Article 41: primary instruction in the minority's own language in towns with a considerable non-Muslim population.
- Article 42: respect for family law, personal status, and the protection of churches, synagogues and cemeteries.
Article 37 commits Türkiye to treat these provisions as fundamental law. Article 44 places them under League of Nations guarantee (a guarantee that lapsed with the League). In Türkiye, the recognized communities are generally understood to be Armenians, Greeks and Jews. Critics, including EU progress reports and some minority organizations, have raised issues such as foundation property and the Halki seminary. Ankara points to the amended foundations legislation of 2008 and the 2011 decree on property restitution as responses.
Timeline
| Date | Instrument or event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| 10 Aug 1920 | Treaty of Sèvres | Signed in Istanbul under occupation; never ratified |
| 22 Nov 1920 | Wilson arbitral award | Based on Sèvres Article 89; never implemented |
| 2–3 Dec 1920 | Treaty of Alexandropol | First treaty between Ankara and an Armenian state |
| 16 Mar 1921 | Treaty of Moscow | North-eastern frontier; Nakhchivan clause |
| 13 Oct 1921 | Treaty of Kars | Confirms Moscow with Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia |
| 24 Jul 1923 | Treaty of Lausanne | Replaces Sèvres; frontiers, status and minorities |
| 16 Dec 1991 | Recognition of Armenia | Türkiye recognizes Armenia's independence |
| 1993 | Border closure | Land border closed in the context of the Karabakh conflict |
| 10 Apr 2005 | Erdoğan letter | Proposal for a Joint Historical Commission |
| 10 Oct 2009 | Zurich Protocols | Mutual recognition of the border by treaty reference; not ratified |
| 14 Jan 2022 | Kılıç–Rubinyan talks | First meeting of Special Representatives (Moscow) |
Key Players & Positions
The short answer: Armenia's government and diaspora organizations broadly agree with Ankara that normalization is desirable, but they differ on how to treat Sèvres, the status of Kars and the historical questions around 1915.
The Republic of Armenia
In the 2009 Zurich Protocols, signed by Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian, Armenia agreed to “the mutual recognition of the existing border between the two countries as defined by relevant treaties of international law” (Protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations, Article 2). Armenia never ratified the Protocols and annulled the process in 2018. Armenia's Constitutional Court ruled in January 2010 that the Protocols were constitutional but could not be interpreted in a way contrary to the Declaration of Independence of 23 August 1990 and the preamble of the constitution. Article 11 of the Declaration refers to international recognition of the 1915 genocide in “Western Armenia” and Ottoman Türkiye. Ankara objected to this reasoning in 2010, while Armenian officials have said it concerns genocide recognition, not territorial claims.
Armenia's current official line, as stated in its Foreign Ministry's communications, is to normalize relations without preconditions and to open the border. It continues to call the 1915 killings genocide.
Diaspora organizations
Diaspora advocacy bodies such as the Armenian National Committee of America and organizations associated with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutyun) generally argue the following:
- The 1915 killings were genocide, and Türkiye should acknowledge and address them.
- Wilson's 1920 arbitral award is a significant historical and moral reference for Armenian claims.
- Kars was signed by Soviet republics under Moscow's direction, so it does not reflect the free will of the Armenian people.
These groups differ among themselves on whether such claims are territorial or political. Some emphasize recognition and reparations only. Readers should consult each organization's own statements.
Azerbaijan and Russia
Azerbaijan is a party to Kars through the Azerbaijan SSR and has a direct interest in Article V on Nakhchivan and the land link to Türkiye. Russia, as successor to the Soviet signatories, is the other main legacy party and has been the host for the first normalization meeting.
International law and scholarship
Three reference points are relevant:
- The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (Article 11) states that succession does not affect a boundary established by treaty. The International Court of Justice stressed the permanence of boundary treaties in the 1994 Libya/Chad case.
- The International Center for Transitional Justice, in a 2003 legal analysis prepared at the request of the Turkish Armenian Reconciliation Commission, concluded that the events include the elements of genocide as defined in the 1948 Convention, but also that the Convention creates no retroactive legal, financial or territorial claims. Turkish officials accept the second conclusion and reject the first.
- In Perinçek v. Switzerland (Grand Chamber, 15 October 2015), the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 10 and said it was not ruling on the legal characterization of the 1915 events.
For how parliaments, courts and historians fit together, see Should Parliaments Rule on History?.
Türkiye's Position
The short answer: Ankara argues that the frontier is settled by treaty, that Sèvres has no legal force, that Lausanne's minority guarantees rest on equal citizenship, and that history should be examined by historians while normalization proceeds.
- The borders are treaty-based and closed to renegotiation. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Moscow (1921), Kars (1921) and Lausanne (1923) treaties fix the frontiers, and Armenia confirmed the point in Article 2 of the 2009 Zurich Protocol. Ankara's legal basis is pacta sunt servanda (Article 26, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties), the rule that boundary treaties survive state succession, and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act principle of the inviolability of frontiers. Türkiye recognized Armenia's independence on 16 December 1991.
- Sèvres has no legal force. Ankara holds that a treaty signed under occupation, never ratified and never in force cannot create rights, and that Lausanne superseded it. The Wilson award, based on Sèvres Article 89, falls with it.
- Lausanne guarantees equality, not separate status. The Turkish position is that Articles 37–45 entrench the equal civil and political rights of non-Muslim Turkish nationals, who are citizens on equal terms under the constitution (Article 10 on equality before the law, Article 66 on citizenship). Ankara says it honours this obligation and cites the 2008 foundations law and the 2011 property decree. It does not accept territorial or autonomy readings of the minority articles.
- Normalization should proceed without preconditions. The Foreign Ministry has described the 14 January 2022 meeting of Special Representatives Serdar Kılıç and Ruben Rubinyan as a step towards full normalization, and the sides agreed in July 2022 to open the land border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders. Turkish officials have linked a full opening to progress in Armenia–Azerbaijan peace, a link Armenia has not accepted as a precondition.
- Historians, not parliaments, should examine 1915. Ankara's “Fair Memory” (Adil Hafıza) approach rests on the 10 April 2005 proposal for a Joint Historical Commission of Turkish, Armenian and international historians, with open archives. It cites the 1948 Genocide Convention's requirement of specific intent (dolus specialis) established by a competent tribunal (Article VI) and the non-retroactivity of treaties (Vienna Convention, Article 28). Ankara therefore rejects the idea that a genocide label creates territorial claims on the Kars frontier.
For a parallel treaty-based argument in the Mediterranean, see Sovereignty at Sea, and for the Cyprus treaty record see Regional Order's analysis of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.
Source Comparison
The short answer: the main disagreements are about the legitimacy of the 1921 treaties and the relevance of Sèvres. Disagreement over the text itself is much narrower.
| Issue | Armenian and diaspora sources | Turkish primary sources | Treaty and legal reference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sèvres | Cited in diaspora advocacy as a historical and moral reference, together with the Wilson award | Never ratified, never in force, superseded by Lausanne | Lausanne (1923) replaced it; Wilson award rested on Sèvres Article 89 |
| Alexandropol | Treated as signed under duress | First treaty with an Armenian state; settlement confirmed by Moscow and Kars | Not implemented; superseded by Kars |
| Kars | Critics say Soviet republics were not free to sign | Valid; Armenia is a successor and confirmed the border in the 2009 Protocols | Vienna Convention 1978, Article 11; ICJ Libya/Chad |
| Lausanne minority articles | Some sources note that Armenians are not named and that Lausanne omitted an Armenian homeland | Equal citizenship; rights implemented through domestic law | Articles 37–45 |
| Joint commission | Concern that it would call the facts into question; prefers recognition first | Proposed 2005 to let historians examine all archives | Zurich Protocol on development of relations envisaged a historical sub-commission |
| Genocide label and borders | Recognition and reparations framed as political and moral | Label does not create territorial claims; legal criteria never met by a tribunal | 1948 Convention, Article VI; ICTJ 2003 non-retroactivity finding |
Western media often use “Sèvres” as shorthand for an unfinished Armenian settlement and rarely distinguish between a signed and a ratified treaty. Turkish sources tend to stress the sequence of treaties and ratifications. Treaty texts, rather than commentary, show that Sèvres never entered into force. They also show that Moscow, Kars and Lausanne were ratified, and that Armenia agreed in 2009 to refer to the relevant treaties for the border.
The Cyprus parallel is worth noting. Lausanne Article 20 is part of the legal history of the island, and our network publications discuss how the 1960 treaties and guarantor rights follow from it. For the Cypriot equal-status debate, see Can the TRNC Be Recognized?.
Key Terms & Related Guides
- Treaty of Sèvres (1920): The unratified Allied–Ottoman peace draft. It never entered into force and was replaced by Lausanne.
- Wilson arbitral award (22 November 1920): A boundary determination for Armenia under Sèvres Article 89. It was never implemented.
- Alexandropol, Moscow, Kars: The 1920–1921 treaties that settled Türkiye's eastern frontier. Kars (13 October 1921) is the principal one.
- Lausanne minorities regime: Articles 37–45 on non-Muslim minorities, grounded in equal citizenship.
- Zurich Protocols (2009): Signed but unratified agreements that included mutual recognition of the existing border by reference to treaties of international law.
- Events of 1915: Türkiye's official term for the wartime events; Armenia and many other states use “genocide”. Dolus specialis means the specific intent required by the 1948 Genocide Convention.
- Fair Memory (Adil Hafıza): Türkiye's call for a historian-led examination with open archives.
Related guides: Should Parliaments Rule on History?; From Partnership Republic to Two States; Fact Check: The Seville Map and EU competence; Editorial Principles; About Politics Republic.
Politics Republic presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources. Published by the Politics Republic Editorial Team.
Frequently asked questions
Is the Treaty of Sèvres still valid?
No. Sèvres was signed on 10 August 1920 but never ratified and never entered into force. The Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 replaced it, and Moscow and Kars had already settled the eastern frontier.
Does the Treaty of Kars still apply after the Soviet Union dissolved?
Türkiye says it does. Boundary treaties are generally treated as surviving state succession (Vienna Convention 1978, Article 11), and Armenia confirmed mutual recognition of the border by treaty reference in the 2009 Zurich Protocols, though it did not ratify them. Some diaspora critics argue that the Soviet republics that signed Kars were not free agents.
What does Lausanne say about minorities in Türkiye?
Articles 37–45 protect non-Muslim minorities, guaranteeing equal civil and political rights, equal treatment in law and in fact, and the right to run their own schools, religious and charitable institutions. Ankara reads these provisions as guarantees of equal citizenship and not as creating a separate status or territorial claim.
What was the 2005 Joint Historical Commission proposal?
On 10 April 2005, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan proposed in a letter to Armenia's president that Turkish, Armenian and international historians examine the 1915 events with access to all archives. Armenia's response was to prioritize normalization first and to resist anything that questioned the facts of the genocide.
What happened in the 14 January 2022 normalization talks?
Special Representatives Serdar Kılıç of Türkiye and Ruben Rubinyan of Armenia met in Moscow in the first round of talks aimed at full normalization without announced preconditions. In July 2022 they agreed to open the land border to third-country nationals and diplomatic passport holders. Readers should check current status, as practical opening has been slower than announced.
Related guides
- Fact Check: Does the 'Seville Map' Have Legal Standing and Can the EU Decide Maritime Boundaries?Fact check: the Seville Map has no legal force in maritime delimitation and the EU cannot set boundaries. See UNCLOS, ICJ practice and Türkiye's UN filings.
- From Partnership Republic to Two States: The 1960 Constitution, 1963 and the Sovereign Equality ThesisRepublic of Cyprus 1960 constitution partnership state history, from Zurich to 1963, 1974, Annan and New York 2024, plus Ankara's sovereign equality thesis.
- Sovereignty at Sea: The 870 km Coast, the Equity Principle and the 2025 Marine Spatial Planning RegistrationTürkiye marine spatial planning IOC-UNESCO registration 2025 explained: the 870 km coast, equity principle, and what it does and does not do in law.
- COP31 and Zero Waste: What Does Türkiye's Climate Diplomacy Aim to Achieve?How Türkiye's Zero Waste initiative and COP31 hosting fit together: UN recognition, climate finance, the Paris Agreement and a middle-power diplomacy.
- Can the TRNC Be Recognized? Statehood Criteria, UN Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 and the Two-State DebateHow statehood and recognition work under international law: Montevideo criteria, UNSC Resolutions 541 and 550, and the TRNC two-state debate explained.
- Should Parliaments Rule on History? Third-Country Resolutions, the Events of 1915 and the Role of Historians and CourtsWhy Türkiye rejects parliamentary genocide resolutions on the Events of 1915 and proposes a Joint Historical Commission, open archives and legal review.
Cross-Publication Perspectives & Cited Research
Related Dossiers Across Partner Publications
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